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The hiring subsidy cum Þring tax in a search model of
unemployment
Ben J. Heijdra





We study the macroeconomic and welfare e ects of a tax-subsidy scheme on labour in a
model with search unemployment. In a second-best world welfare increases if unemploy-
ment is ine ciently high or if there are pre-existing Þscal distortions. JEL classiÞcation
codes: J3, J680. Keywords: hiring subsidy, Þring tax, job search, equilibrium unem-
ployment.
1 Introduction
We analyze the macroeconomic and welfare e ects of a hiring subsidy cum Þring tax scheme.
Under this scheme job matches are subsidized and separations are taxed at the same amount.
Pissarides’ (1990) search-theoretic model of the labour market is extended and embedded
within a simple macroeconomic model of a small open economy with endogenous labour
supply. Although a substantial literature exists on hiring subsidies, on the one hand, and
Þring costs on the other hand,1 the literature has not addressed both in a fully speciÞed
macroeconomic model.
The model shows that a tax-subsidy on labour pushes up economy-wide wages, increases
vacancies, and reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate. Intuitively, the Þrm receiving
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1 See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a,b) and Snower and de la Dehesa (1998) for an overview of this
literature. Millard and Mortensen (1997) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998)—employing an extension of
Pissarides’ model that features an endogenous job destruction process—have shown that hiring subsidies reduce
the duration of unemployment but have an ambiguous e ect on the unemployment rate.
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the subsidy when it hires a worker can deposit it at a bank at the market rate of interest so
when the time comes to pay the Þring tax it is left with the accrued interest as a net subsidy.
Welfare increases in a second-best world if the initial unemployment rate is ine ciently high
or if there are pre-existing Þscal distortions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 derives the
macroeconomic e ects of a marginal change in the tax-subsidy rate. Section 4 discusses the
welfare e ects, and section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Households
The representative household consists of inÞnitely many members and each member cares
only about the lifetime utility achieved by the household. Individual household members
experience risk in the labour market which is fully insured within the household. Since there
are inÞnitely many members, household income is non-stochastic.2 Lifetime utility of the
representative household is denoted by ( ):
( )
Z
log ( ) ( ) 0 (1)
where is the pure rate of time preference, and is full consumption which depends positively




where and stand for units of time spent on, respectively, working and on searching
for a job.4 The household has a time endowment of unity so that leisure, , is equal to
1 . At each instant of time some unemployed household members Þnd a job but
some employed members lose their job as idiosyncratic shocks destroy a constant proportion
of the pre-existing matches between Þrms and workers. As a result, the household’s stock of
employment evolves according to:
ú (3)
where ú , is the matching rate (to be determined below) and is the exogenous
job destruction rate.5
2 This assumption is quite standard in the macroeconomic literature. See, for example, Andolfatto (1996),
Merz (1995), Galí (1996), Den Haan et al. (1997), Shi and Wen (1997, 1999).
3 The form of the felicity function was suggested (albeit in a di erent context) by Greenwood, Hu man,
and Hercowitz (1988). In essence, the functional form eliminates the wealth e ect from the labour market
participation function. See equation (9) below.
4 The time index is dropped where no confusion arises.
5 We assume an exogenous job destruction rate to keep the model as simple as possible. Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994, 1999a) and Merz (1997) show how can be endogenized.
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The household’s budget identity is:
ú + (1 ) + (4)
where ú , is the stock of real tangible assets, is the given real world rate of
interest,6 is the before-tax wage rate, is the labour income tax, is the unemployment
beneÞt (a subsidy on job searching), and is a lump-sum tax.
The household chooses time paths for consumption, searching time and tangible assets
in order to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to the accumulation identities (3)-(4) and
various transversality conditions. It takes as given its initial stocks of Þnancial assets and
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[ ( )(1 ) ( )] ( + )( ) (7)
( ) = [ ( ) + ( )] (8)
+ = + (9)
where ( ) is the pecuniary value of an additional job in the planning period, is the
reservation wage and ( ) is after-tax human wealth:
( )
Z ·






= ( ) ( ) + ( )
Z






( )1+ ( ) (12)
Equation (5) is the usual Euler equation relating the optimal time proÞle for full consumption
to the di erence between the interest rate and the pure rate of time preference. As is well
known in the macroeconomic literature, the representative-agent model for the small open
economy only has a meaningful steady-state solution if the interest rate equals the rate of
pure time preference, i.e. if = (Turnovsky, 1997). It follows from (5) that there is no
transition in full consumption in that case ( ú = 0). Expression (6) shows that the pecuniary
value of an additional job at time equals the present value of the “dividend” earned on
the job (equalling the excess of the after-tax wage over the unemployment beneÞt) using
6 The domestic economy is small in world capital markets, so that the world real rate of interest is
exogenously given.
7 Details of all computations are given in Heijdra and Ligthart (2001) which can be downloaded from the
Þrst author’s web page.
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+ + as the instantaneous discount rate. (An equivalent expression involving the reservation
wage is given in (7)). Equation (8) is the closed-form expression for full consumption in the
planning period showing that the household consumes a constant proportion of its total
wealth. Equation (9) shows that labour supply depends positively on the reservation wage,
. By participating in the labour market, rather than enjoying leisure, the household not
only receives the unemployment beneÞt, , but also has a non-zero probability, , of locating
a job with a pecuniary value of . Equation (10) shows that human wealth is the present
value of the “surplus” derived from labour market participation minus lump-sum taxes. This
surplus consists of the after-tax revenues from employment and search activities minus the
felicity cost of supplying the optimal amount of hours to the labour market.8 Finally, (11)-(12)
show the relationship between human wealth, the value of a job, and the initial employment
level.
2.2 Firms
There is a large (and Þxed) number of identical Þrms in the economy. To save on notation
we normalize the number of such Þrms to unity. Following Pissarides (1990, p. 22) we
assume that each Þrm is large so that it faces certain ßows into and out of its labour force.
The representative Þrm is perfectly competitive and uses labour ( ) to produce units of the
homogeneous good ( ):9
= 0 (13)
where 0 is the given level of labour productivity. The Þrm faces linear costs of adjusting its
stock of labour. In order to augment its work force it must post vacancies ( ) in order to
Þnd a worker. The Þrm’s labour force thus changes according to:
ú = (14)
where is the instantaneous probability of the Þrm Þnding a worker with whom it concludes
a deal (1 is thus the expected duration of a vacancy). In addition to Þnding new workers
at each instant, the Þrm also loses a given proportion of its work force due to idiosyncratic
shocks (see also (3) above).
The objective function of the Þrm is the present value of its cash ßow:
( ) =
Z h
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) + ú ( )
i
( ) (15)
where is the ßow cost per vacancy (modelled in terms of lost output), and is a subsidy
on net hirings. If ú is negative the Þrm must pay the government, so is also a Þring tax.
8 If labour supply is exogenous ( = 0) there is no disutility from labour market participation and the term
involving drops out of (10).
9 We abstract from capital to keep the model as simple as possible.
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The Þrm chooses time paths for output, vacancies and employment in order to maximize (15)
subject to the production function (13) and the accumulation identity for workers (14), taking
as given its initial labour force ( ( )). Optimal Þrm behaviour is characterized by:
+ = (16)
( ) = ( ) ( ) (17)
( ) =
Z
[ 0 ( ) ]
( + )( ) (18)
where ( ) is the value to the Þrm of an additional worker in the planning period. According
to (16) the Þrm sets its vacancies such that the expected costs of recruitment per worker
(right-hand side) equals the value to the Þrm of that worker inclusive of the hiring subsidy
(left-hand side). Equation (17) shows that the stock market value of the Þrm is equal to the
replacement value of its labour force. Finally, (18) shows that the value of an occupied job
to the Þrm is equal to the present value of the “dividend” it earns on that job, using + as
the instantaneous discount rate. This dividend consists of the excess of labour productivity
over the wage (that is, 0 ) minus the expected Þring tax ( ).
2.3 Job matching and wage bargaining
Firms with vacancies and job-seeking workers are matched in a random fashion. If there are
job seekers and vacancies then the number of contacts, , at each instant of time is given
by the matching function 1 , with 0 1. DeÞning labour market tightness as
we Þnd that the job-Þnding rate for the worker and the worker-Þnding rate for the
Þrm are given by:
( ) = 1 ( ) = (19)
from which it follows that ( ) = ( ), 0 0 00, and 0 0 00. DeÞning as the
(absolute value of the) elasticity of the ( ) function (0 0( ) ( ) 1) we Þnd that
1 is the elasticity of the ( ) function.
When a Þrm with a vacancy and a job-seeking worker meet, a pure economic rent is
created equal to + + , where the superscript refers to a particular worker-Þrm
pairing. Following standard practice in this literature (see, e.g., Pissarides (1990, p. 11)),
we assume that this rent is shared across the two parties according to the generalized Nash
wage-bargaining solution. The wage in the planning period is thus:







where and 1 are the bargaining weights of, respectively, the worker and the Þrm, and
where ( ) and ( ) are obtained from, respectively, (7) and (18) by substituting = .
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The wage resulting from this bargaining process can be written in two equivalent ways:










Since all worker-Þrm pairings are identical and wages are renegotiated at each instant,10 the
model is symmetric and the wage does not feature a pairing index . According to (21), the
wage equals the weighted average of, on the one hand, the marginal product of labour plus the
interest income from the hiring subsidy ( 0 + ) and, on the other hand, the tax-adjusted
reservation wage ( (1 )). Equation (22) shows that the wage can also be expressed
as a weighted average of the tax-adjusted unemployment beneÞt ( (1 )) and the Þrm’s
“surplus” ( 0 + + ). The latter consists of not only the marginal product of labour
plus the interest earnings on the hiring subsidy but also includes the search costs that are
foregone if the deal is struck ( ).11
2.4 Model closure
In the absence of public debt, the government budget constraint is given by:
+ = + ú (23)
The outlays on unemployment beneÞts and the vacancy subsidy (cum Þring tax) are covered
by the revenue from the pre-existing labour income tax and by lump-sum taxes. An immediate
implication of (23) is that in the steady-state, with ú = 0, the hiring subsidy cum Þring tax
does not represent a net resource requirement for the government.
Asset market equilibrium ensures that household wealth equals the value of outstanding
Þnancial assets:
+ (24)
where are shares in the domestic Þrms and are net foreign assets. By di erentiating
(24) with respect to time and noting (4), (15), and (23), we obtain the expression for the
current account: ú = +[ ], where the term in square brackets is the trade
account showing that domestic output less domestic absorption equals net exports. Domestic
absorption consists of consumption by households plus investment in the stock of employment.
10 In renegotiations the match surplus is still given by + + but now represents Þring costs that
are foregone if the match is continued. See Mortensen and Pissarides (1998, p. 8) on this point.







Note also that so that is the average hiring cost per job seeker.
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( ) ( ) ( )
i
( ) (25)
To the extent that the country is a net creditor to the rest of the world ( ( ) 0) it can
a ord to run current account deÞcits in the future. National solvency is retained provided
the present value of current account deÞcits (the right-hand side of (25)) equals the initial
level of net foreign assets (the left-hand side of (25)).
3 The vacancy subsidy cum Þring tax
In this section we study the macroeconomic e ects of an increase in the vacancy subsidy cum
Þring tax. As was pointed out above, we assume that the interest rate equals the rate of pure
time preference ( = ) so that there is no transition in full consumption ( ú = 0). From the
labour market part of the model we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Without anticipation e ects, there is no transitional dynamics in , , ,
, , , and . These variables jump to their new steady-state values following any
unanticipated and permanent shock to any of the parameters ( , , 0, , ) or policy
variables ( , , ).














It follows from this expression that ú 0 so that with time-invariant shocks the only
economically sensible solution is for to equal its steady-state value. ¤
The determination of the steady-state can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 1. The
wage setting curve, WS, is deÞned in (22) and is upward sloping. By combining (16) and
(18)-(19) and noting Proposition 1 (viz. that ú = 0), the vacancy creation curve, VC, can




The VC curve is downward sloping and convex towards the origin (as 0 1). The initial
steady state is in point E0. An increase in the hiring subsidy shifts up the WS curve (from
WS0 to WS1) as workers are able to bargain for a higher wage. At the same time the policy















Figure 1: The hiring subsidy cum Þring tax
(from VC0 to VC1) which dominates the shift in the WS curve. The new steady state is at
E1 which lies north-east from E0.








+ ( + )
+ ( + )
¶
0 (28)
where is the steady-state job-Þnding rate of workers. The increase in makes it easier for
the unemployed to locate a job ( 0) and leads to increases in the reservation wage
( 0) and (if 0) labour market participation ( ( + ) 0). By using
(9) in the steady-state version of (3) we derive:
= (1 ) ( ) = ( ) (29)
where ( + ) = ( + ) is the steady-state unemployment rate. Steady-state
employment rises unambiguously, both because the unemployment rate falls and (if 0)
because labour market participation increases. The e ect on steady-state search activities is
ambiguous because the unemployment rate falls but labour market participation rises. If
is small (large) the rate e ect dominates (is dominated by) the participation e ect so that
job search falls (rises) in the long run. Since = ( ) steady-state vacancies
increase unambiguously.
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The policy shock induces non-trivial transitional dynamics in labour market ßows. Indeed,
by using (1) and (9) we Þnd that ú = ( ) ( + ) , or:
( ) =
h
1 ( + )( )
i
+ ( + )( ) ( ) (30)
where and ( ) are, respectively, steady-state and initial employment. The transition
speed in the labour market is equal to + .12 Assuming that the system is initially in
steady-state equilibrium (so that ( ) = ) we Þnd that employment gradually increases as




1 ( + )( )
iµ ¶
(31)
The transitional dynamics in the unemployment rate and job-seeking activities can be deduced
by noting that = 1 ( ) and = ( ) . If labour supply is exogenous ( = 0),
the paths for the unemployment rate and job search mirror the path of employment: at
impact nothing happens and over time both and gradually decrease. If labour supply is
endogenous ( 0), both and increase at impact and gradually decline over time.
4 Welfare e ects
In the previous section we have shown that an increase in the vacancy subsidy cum Þring
tax is quite successful at stimulating employment and reducing the unemployment rate in the
economy. In this section we study the welfare e ects of such a policy initiative. We Þrst state
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The market solution is e cient if the following conditions hold:
= = = = 0
Proof. In the Þrst-best optimum the social planner chooses paths for , , , and in
order to maximize (1) subject to (3), (19), and (25), taking as given the initial stocks, ( )
and ( ). The Þrst-order conditions exactly coincide with those for the decentralized market
solution if and only if the conditions stated in the proposition hold. See Heijdra and Ligthart
(2001) for details. ¤
The Þrst of these conditions is the well-known Hosios (1990) condition. With the Cobb-
Douglas matching function adopted in this paper, is a constant and the Hosios condition
only holds in the knife-edge case for which the worker’s relative bargaining power happens
12 Shi and Wen (1999, p. 472) suggests that, on a quarterly basis, reasonable values are = 0 05 and
= 0 79 (an expected unemployment duration of 1.27 quarters). These values imply that labour market
transition is very fast.
9
to be equal to the elasticity of the matching function. If the Hosios condition holds then it
follows from Proposition 2 that all subsidies and taxes should be equal to zero.
In practice, of course, advanced economies do have unemployment beneÞt systems and
do use the labour income tax to raise revenue. In addition, the Hosios condition may not
hold in reality. In the remainder of this paper we therefore study the welfare e ects of a
vacancy subsidy cum Þring tax in this second-best setting. To keep matters simple, we
restrict attention to the case of exogenous labour supply ( = 0) (see Heijdra and Ligthart
(2001) for the general case). We Þrst state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 With exogenous labour supply ( = 0) a marginal change in the hiring subsidy
















where is given in (27).
Proof. In the market equilibrium ú = 0 (because = in the small open economy) so that
welfare is proportional to the level of full consumption which itself depends on total wealth
(see (8)). By using (10), (15), (23)-(24), and setting = 0, total wealth can be written
as: ( ) = ( ) +
R
[ 0 ( ) ( )]
( ) . By substituting the transition path for
employment (given in equation (30) above) into this expression we obtain:





+ ( ) +
¶
[ ( ) + ( )]
¸
where ( ) and ( ) are the pre-existing stocks of, respectively, net foreign assets and
employment. By di erentiating this expression with respect to and simplifying we obtain
the expression stated in the proposition. Details are found in Heijdra and Ligthart (2001). ¤
Proposition 3 has several interesting implications. First, we note that, since 0
(see (27)), the sign of the welfare e ect is fully determined by the sign of . Second, the
proposition conÞrms the Þrst-best results discussed above. If the Hosios condition holds
( = ) and both subsidies are zero ( = = 0) then a marginal change in the hiring
subsidy cum Þring tax does not have Þrst-order welfare e ects. Intuitively, this is because
the economy is in the e cient equilibrium in that case.13 Third, even if the Hosios condition
holds it is advantageous to introduce a hiring subsidy cum Þring tax if there is a pre-existing
13 The pre-existing labour income tax does not matter because labour supply is exogenous. Heijdra and
Ligthart (2001) show that if labour supply is endogenous ( 0), = = = 0, and 0, welfare
increases with the introduction of a hiring subsidy cum Þring tax ( ( ) 0). Intuitively, this result
follows because in that case partially o sets the distorting e ect of the labour income tax rate on labour
market participation.
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unemployment subsidy: partially o sets the distorting e ect of on labour market
participation in that case. Fourth, an expression for the second-best optimal hiring subsidy














Equation (32) illustrates the various reasons why the hiring subsidy may be beneÞcial in a
second-best world. It can correct for pre-existing Þscal distortions (Þrst term on the right-
hand side) or for the ine ciency originating from the structure of the labour market itself
(second term).
5 Conclusions
Firms Þring workers impose costs upon society in terms of unemployment beneÞts, retraining,
and other labour market measures. The formal literature on active labour market policies
has suggested using (marginal) employment subsidies or hiring subsidies as one way to deal
with the problem of unemployment. This paper explores a new policy strategy—a subsidy-tax
scheme on labour—as an alternative to budgetary costly employment subsidy schemes. It is
shown—using a simple search-theoretic model of the labour market embedded in a dynamic
macroeconomic model—that if a Þrm pays a tax when it Þres a worker to be reimbursed
when it (re)hires that or another worker, the economy-wide wage goes up, the natural rate
of unemployment declines, and vacancies increase. In a second-best world welfare increases if
the initial unemployment rate is ine ciently high or if there are pre-existing Þscal distortions.
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